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QUO WARRANTO IN FLORIDA
RlcmAmD W. ERvN AND Roy T. BHODES

The modem information in the nature of a quo warranto has been
defined as an information, criminal in form, presented to a court of
competent jurisdiction by the attorney general for the purpose of
correcting the usurpation, misuse, or nonuser of a public office or corporate franchise.' In its broadest sense quo warranto is a writ of
inquiry as to the warrant for doing the act complained of; it lies to
test the right of a person to hold an office or franchise or to exercise
some right or privilege the peculiar powers of which are derived from
the state.2 Blackstone defines quo warranto as a high prerogative
writ, in the nature of a writ of right for the King, which lay against
him who obtained or usurped any office, franchise, or liberty of the
Crown, and which also lay in case of nonuser or long neglect of a
franchise or in case of misuser or abuse of it.a
HISTORY

The origin of quo warranto is, at least among American judges,
generally said to be obscured by antiquity and little known save
that the writ came into existence early in the history of the systematization of English law.4 The ancient writ became obsolete in England because of both the finality of judgment against the Crown and
the complicated, cumbersome nature of the proceeding. It was supplanted in time by the remedy of information in the nature of a
quo warranto, which in its origin was criminal-designed not only to
oust the usurper of the franchise claimed by him but also to punish
him by fine for such usurpation.; While history does not fix pretHIGH, ExnmtoRNARY LEGAL RmEDIEs §591 (3rd ea. 1896).
2
State ex rel. Davis v. Clarke, 96 Fla. 518, 118 So. 308 (1928); Ex parte
Smith, 96 Fla. 512, 118 So. 306 (1928); State ex rel Merrill v. Gerow, 79 Fla.
804, 85 So. 144 (1920).
38 BL. COMM. 0263.
4See Nebraska ex rel. Wakely v. Lockwood, 3 Wall. 236, 238 (U.S. 1865);
Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 26 Del. (3 Boyce) 1, 85-36, 79 At. 790, 795
(Sup. Ct. 1911); Buckman v. State ex rel. Spencer, 34 Fla. 48, 56, 15 So. 697,
699 (1894).
UBuckman v. State ex rel. Spencer, 34 Fla. 48, 15 So. 697 (1894).
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cisely the date of inception of this latter remedy, it was in use contemporaneously with the writ of quo warranto well prior to express
statutory recognition early in the eighteenth century.6
By constitutional and statutory enactments the various English
statutes relating to quo warranto have been made part of the judicature of the various states. The Supreme Court of Florida observed
in 1894:7
" .
for some time before the revolution the writ was regarded in England, though criminal in form, as a civil proceeding to test the right of a part)' to exercise a franchise, and of
ousting a wrongful possessor. It has always been considered
as a civil remedy at law by the great majority of the American
courts, and our own court has so regarded it."
As regards any differences between the two actions, our Supreme
Court stated as early as 1868 that ". . . the terms 'quo warranto,'
and 'information' in the nature of a quo warranto, are used as synonymous and convertible terms, the object and end of each being
substantially the same."8 The fact that the terms are for all practical
purposes synonymous should be kept in mind.
CoUrTs AUToz

TO ISSUE QUo WAARANTO

Authority for quo warranto proceedings finds expression both in
our Constitution and in our statutes. 9 The Constitution itself confers
both original and appellate jurisdiction in quo warranto proceedings
upon the Supreme Court,10 and concurrent original jurisdiction upon
the various circuit courts" and the Court of Record in and for Es1
cambia County. 2
In the leading Florida case,' 3 which is also one of the leading
69 ANNE, c. 20 (1710); see Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 26 Del. (3 Boyce)
1, 35-36, 79 AtI. 790, 795 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
7See Buckman v. State ex rel. Spencer, 34 Fla. 48, 57, 15 So. 697, 699 (1894).
8
State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190, 208 (1868).
9
F A. STAT. §§80.01-80.04, 165.30, 542.02, 618.23, 619.09, 637.55 (1949).
10

FLA.
FLA.
2
1

CONST.

Art. V, §5.
§11.

CONST. Art. V,

1 FLA. CONST. Art. V,
3

§89.

1 State ex rel.

Att'y Gen. v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190, 209 (1868)
ouster entered against Lieutenant-Governor Gleason).
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cases in the United States on quo warranto, our Supreme Court held
that a constitutional reference to quo warranto 14 similar to that of the
current Article V, Section 5, includes an information in the nature
of quo warranto and that such a constitutional grant of power can
be exercised by the Supreme Court without legislative action prescribing the manner of its exercise.
PARms

The power to file an information in the nature of quo warranto
being incident to his office, the Attorney General of Florida is the
proper party to bring it against a person holding public office for
the purpose of inquiring into the title of such individual.' 5 The
bench cannot inquire into the motives prompting this filing, whether
they be those of the Attorney General or those of a third person
allegedly influencing his action, 16 nor can it grant or withhold leave
to file.' 7 Of course the court, upon considering the return to the
writ and taking into account the effect of the requested remedy
upon the public interest, may refuse to grant such remedy; adjudication of the substantive issues involved is strictly a judicial function, even when the request for a certain type of judgment emanates from the Attorney General.' 8
The proper practice, in a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto to inquire into title to a public office, is to institute proceedings
in the name of the State of Florida upon relation of the Attorney
General. In any such proceeeding any mention of a relator other
than the Attorney General is mere surplusage and in no way affects
either the validity of the information or the absolute control of the
case on behalf of the state by the Attorney General.' 9 This is true
because the entire authority and responsibility is vested in the Attorney General2" and cannot be delegated by him to anyone else
14 FLA. CoNsT. Art. VI, §5 (1868).

15State ex tel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929 (1905); State
ex tel. Att'y Gen. v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1868).

16State ex rel. Att'y Gen., supra note 15; State ex tel. Landis v. S. H. Kress
& Co., 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823 (1934).
1
7State ex tel. Landis v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra note 16.
1
sWinter Haven v. State ex tel. Landis, 125 Fla. 892, 170 So. 100 (1936).
19
State ex tel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 298, 39 So. 929 (1905); State ex tel.
Landis v. S. H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823 (1934).
20
State ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225 (1929).
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or even cast upon the courts. 2 ' Similarly, the general common law
rule is that a private individual, without the intervention of the
Attorney General, cannot file an information in the nature of quo
warranto to test the existence of a public franchise. 22 Only by virtue of our statutes may a private individual today file a quo warranto information when the Attorney General refuses to act upon
complaints of usurpation of public office without title 23 or of unauthorized action based allegedly on a franchise. 24 The Attorney
General has absolute discretion as to whether he will bring a quo
warranto proceeding on information furnished him by private citizens, 25 but the Legislature has granted to the citizenry for their
21

State ex tel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929 (1905).
State ex tel. Harris v. King, 134 Fla. 58, 183 So. 926 (1938); State ex tel.
Wurn v. Kasserman, 131 Fla. 234, 179 So. 410 (1988); State ex rel. Johnson v.
Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473 (1926).
23
FLA. STAT. §80.01 (1949) provides: "Any person claiming title to an office
which is exercised by another shall have the right, upon refusal by the attorney
general to institute proceedings in the name of the state upon such claimant's
relation, or upon the attorney general's refusal to file a complaint setting forth
his name as the person rightfully entitled to the office, to file an information or
institute an action in the name of the state against the person exercising the
office, setting up his own claim. In this case the court is authorized and required
to determine the right of the claimant to the office, if he so desires. However,
in this, as well as in all other proceedings of this character, no person shall be
adjudged entitled to hold an office except upon full proof of his title to the
office." For an able historical discussion see the various opinions in State
ex tel. St. Petersburg v. Noel, 114 Fla. 175, 154 So. 214 (1934).
24
FLA. STAT. §165.30, enacted as Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25275, on June 13 provides: "Any person, or persons, association of persons, or corporation, who shall
be the owner or owners of lands located and situate within the territorial boundary
of a city, town or hamlet within the state shall have the right, upon refusal of
the attorney general to institute proceedings in the name of the state upon the
relation of such person or persons, to institute proceedings upon writs of quo
warranto, or upon information in the nature of such writs, in the name of
the state, to attack or challenge the validity of the municipal corporation wherein
such lands are located, and the legal existence of its corporate franchises. In
all such proceedings, the said municipal corporation and the members of its
governing body shall be made parties defendant. The information filed in such
proceedings shall set forth under oath a prima facie case of right in the relator
or relators to challenge the validity of the municipal corporation of [sic] the
exercise by it of its municipal franchises."
25
State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1868); cf. Farrington v.
Flood, 40 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1949).
22
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additional protection a right in each claimant to bring the proceeding on his own relation.26 Furthermore, he may have his own counsel as regards his claim; 27 and if the Attorney General institutes the
proceeding without making all claimants parties any omitted claimant can, upon making out a prima facie case by sworn petition and
by giving satisfactory security for such costs as may be awarded
against him, insist that he be made a party.28 Each party claiming
without the consent of the Attorney General is bound by a judgment
against him, but the state is not bound; conversely, the judgment in
a proceeding instituted by the Attorney General does not bind a
claimant that is not a party.2 9 In summary, then, anyone with what
may be termed a "real" interest at stake, that is, a claimant of title
to a public office or a property owner within a municipality, has,
upon the refusal of the Attorney General to act, sufficient interest
under the statutes to institute proceedings on his own behalf in the
name of the state.
The foregoing discussion presents the constitutional and statutory
provisions of a general nature, but the Supreme Court has extended
the remedy even further. In 1936 Mr. Justice Terrell characterized quo warranto as a remedial as well as a prerogative writ, and
added that ". . . this court will not refuse to extend its use on
proper showing made."30 He continued: 31
it is well settled that when the enforcement of a public
right is sought, the people are the real party to the cause. The
relator need not show that he has any real or personal interest
in it. It is enough that he is a citizen and interested in having
the law upheld, but this, like all other rules of law, has its
limitations."
2

6See notes 23, 24 supra.
Fr.. STAT. §80.02 (1949).
FLA. STAT. §80.03 (1949).
29
FIA. STAT. §80.04 (1949).
30
State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 126 Fla. 49, 50, 170 So. 736, 737 (1936);
see also State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 143 So. 638 (Sept.
1932) (reviewing many instances in which the common law writ of quo warranto
has been extended and employed for purposes other than those for which it
was originally conceived); State ex rel. Bauder v. Markle, 107 Fla. 742, 142
So. 829
(July 1932).
S1 State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 126 Fla. 49, 52, 170 So. 786, 738 (1936).
27
28
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The relators, as citizens and taxpayers, were seeking to invalidate
an election in which many voted who were unqualified by reason
of having failed to register and pay the poll taxes required by law.
While denying relief on the ground of resulting confusion, disorder,
and public injury outweighing the individual rights of complainants,
the Court emphatically defended the right of the relators, as citizens
and taxpayers, to bring a proceeding in quo warranto to enforce
public rights. Subsequent decisions have not altered this position.
SCOPE TODAY

It is apparent from the basic definition of quo warranto 82 that
its normal purposes are to test the right or title to office and to
remedy usurpation or misuse of franchise; and the generally accepted rule is that in the absence of statutory provisions to the con33
trary it is the only proper remedy available in such instances.
Conversely, it is not available when the law provides another rem34
edy sufficient to effect the relief sought.
Injunction will not lie to prevent usurpation of a franchise or
office, even though the respondent has not entered upon the duties
of the office. The remedy is at law, by quo warranto, to be invoked
after entry or an attempt to exercise authority by virtue of the elec5
tion or appointment.3
Quo warranto, like the writ of mandamus, never lies to enforce
performance of a private contract.3" It may, however, be employed
to determine the right of an officer of a private corporation to ex-See notes 1, 2, 3 supra.
Winter v. Mack, 142 Fla. 1, 194 So. 225 (1940); see McSween v. State
Live Stock Sanitary Board, 97 Fla. 750, 761, 122 So. 239, 244 (1929). For a
similar federal statement of the law see Selser v. City of Stuart, 135 F.2d 211
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 769 (1943); Morin v. City of Stuart, 111
F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1940). Note, however, the availability of a bill in equity
in attacking illegal exercise of authority by a municipal corporation lacking de
facto as well as de jure existence, Farrington v. Flood, 40 So.2d 462 (Fla.
1949), explaining Chavous v. Goodbread, 156 Fla. 599, 23 So.2d 761 (1945).
34
State ex rel. Landis v. Duval County, 105 Fla. 174, 141 So. 173 (1932)
(adequate remedy provided by statute).
35Winter v. Mack, 142 Fla. 1, 194 So. 225 (1940); MacDonald v. Rehrer.
22 Fla. 198 (1886).
36See State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 366, 39 So. 929, 952 (1905).
33
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ercise an office.3 7 A corporation is a creature of the law and cannot
exist without governmental authority. Furthermore the grant of
its franchise, or charter, is always subject to the condition that it
will exercise its privileges properly; and whenever it violates this
trust by doing acts inconsistent with the nature of the grant the
state may proceed by quo warranto against it to prevent such unauthorized acts or even to oust it of its entire franchise. To justify
the employment of quo warranto to oust an official the office must
be of a public nature;38 but here again the essentially public origin
of even a private corporation as a matter of law has exerted its
influence. Offices held public in nature range from municipal officers3 9 and harbormasters 40 to official nominees chosen in a party
primary,41 members of a county executive committee of the Democratic party,42 and even officers of a corporation commonly called
"private" because of its membership as distinct from a so-called
public corporation such as a municipality. 43 When any official
usurps a position of public trust created by the people of Florida
the remedy is in quo warranto; but mere abuse of discretion in discharging the functions of the office, as distinguished from the title
itself to such office, cannot be attacked by quo warranto. 44
The right of a city to exercise jurisdiction over certain lands is
properly tested by quo warranto,4 5 whether assailed on the ground
that the inclusion of the lands in question was illegal because they
37

Gentry-Futch Co. v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925).
State ex tel. St. Petersburg v. Noel, 114 Fla. 175, 154 So. 214 (1934).
39
State ex tel. Page v. Dannelly, 139 Fla. 320, 190 So. 593 (1939).
40
State ex tel. Watson v. Friend, 152 Fla. 74, 11 So.2d 182 (1942); Winter
v. Mack, 142 Fla. 1, 194 So. 225 (1940).
41State ex tel. Page v. Dannelly, 139 Fla. 320, 190 So. 593 (1939); State
ex tel. Jones v. Fernandez, 107 Fla. 849, 143 So. 642 (1932); State ex rel.
Watds v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 143 So. 638 (1932).
42
State ex tel. Feltman v. Hughes, 49 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1950); accord, State
ex tel. Merrill v. Gerow, 79 Fla. 804, 85 So. 144 (1920), in which, however,
38

the facts showed that the Republican Party was at the time too small to qualify
as a political party and that therefore its state chairmanship was not subject
to quo warranto proceedings.

48
Davidson v. State ex tel. Banks, 20 Fla. 784 (1884). An excellent presentation of the theory underlying this availability of quo warranto appears in
Brooks v. State ex tel. Richards, 26 Del. (3 Boyce) 1, 37-39, 79 AtL 790, 796

(Sup. Ct. 1911).
44

State ex tel. Landis v. Valz, 117 Fla. 311, 157 So. 651 (1934).
State ex tel. Harrington v. Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610 (1939).

45
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have not been furnished proper municipal benefits 46 or on the ground
that the municipality has not legally incorporated. 47
And, as
already noted, upon the refusal of the Attorney General to act any
landowner may today institute quo warranto proceedings against
a municipal corporation, 48 although prior to the statutory authorization the Court held that such proceedings against a municipality
49
could be brought by the Attorney General only.
The Attorney General alone is by statute" entrusted with authority to attack the validity of creation and right to do business of certain types of corporations, namely, agricultural cooperative marketing associations and nonprofit cooperative associations. The legislative words "but not otherwise" appear to exclude the right of an individual to bring the proceedings if the Attorney General refuses to
do so. It should also be noted that the Attorney General is specifically designated as the official vested with the power to test the
authority of a foreign corporation to continue to do business in
Florida after violating the statutory prohibition of combinations restricting trade or commerce. 51
Federal and state offices are within the control of the respective
governments creating them; and, since the one has no power to
declare vacant an office established by the other, it cannot proceed
by quo warranto to oust an incumbent. Much the same proposition
holds true in regard to corporations. Though Florida courts may
exercise both injunctive and quo warranto jurisdiction to prevent
levy of taxes by a municipality, federal courts may not exercise quo
52
warranto jurisdiction.
46

E.g., South Miami v. State ex rel. Landis, 140 Fla. 740, 192 So. 624 (1939);
State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409 (1933).
47
Compare Farrington v. Flood, 40 So.2d 462 (Fla., May 3, 1949), with

Heyward v. Hall, 144 Fla. 344, 198 So. 114 (1940). Note that both decisions
were rendered prior to the enactment of FLA. STAT. §165.30 (1949); see note
24 supra.
48
See
49

note 24 supra.
E.g., Robinson v. Jones, 14 Fla. 256 (1873); see notes 24, 47 supra.

50

FLA. STAT. §§618.23, 619.09 (1949).
51Fr A. STAT. §542.04 (1949) provides: "Every foreign corporation violating

any of the provisions of this chapter is denied the right and prohibited from
doing business within this state. The Attorney General shall enforce this provision by injunction, or other proper proceedings, in the name of the State of
Florida." Cf. FLA. STAT. §542.03 (1949), relating to domestic corporations.
52
Morin v. City of Stuart, 111 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1940).
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PROCEDMUE

Generally speaking, proceedings in quo warranto are governed
53
by the same principles and rules that govern other civil actions.
Ordinary statutes of limitation, however, whether civil or penal, have
no application to quo warranto proceedings brought to enforce a public
right. Laches cannot generally be imputed to the state, which is not as
a rule estopped or barred by laches from proceeding in quo warranto to enforce a public right.54 When, however, certain citizens
waited for some four months before attempting to invalidate a primary election on the ground that more than half the voters were
not qualified because of their failure to register and pay poll taxes,
and sought quo warranto less than one month before the general
election, the Court denied relief on the ground of laches.55
The information, as a general rule in quo warranto proceedings
instituted by the Attorney General in the name of the state and
alleging usurpation of a public office or franchise, need merely
allege in general terms that the person holding the office or the
person or corporation enjoying the franchise does so without lawful
authority; the respondent must then show his constitutional or statutory authority, whereupon the Attorney General must in turn
6
assume the burden of setting forth any facts outside that authority.
The return cannot prevail by merely alleging due appointment or
election to office, but must also show that the respondent has met
57
all the requisites qualifying him to take possession of the office.
On the other hand, an information filed by a claimant as relator upon
the refusal of the Attorney General to do so must establish his own
title in order to oust the candidate declared elected, inasmuch as
s3 State ex tel. Law v. Saxon, 25 Fla. 342, 5 So. 801 (1889); cf. State ex rel.

Johnson v. Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 478 (1926); State ex tel. Att'y Gen.
v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1868).
54
See Landis ex tel. Quigg v. Reeve, 106 Fla. 28, 29, 142 So. 654 (1932).
But cf. an exception even to this rule in Winter Haven v. State ex tel. Landis,
125 Fla. 392, 170 So. 100 (1936).
GGState
ex tel. Pooser v. Wester, 126 Fla. 49, 170 So. 736 (1936).
6
eState ex tel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 385 (1929), citing
CRANDAI., FLORIDA COMMON LAw PRAcTIcE 672 (1928); Simonton v. State
ex tel. Turman, 44 Fla. 289, 81 So. 821 (1902); Enterprise v. State ex tel.
Att'y Gen., 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740 (1892).
57
State ex tel. Law v. Saxon, 25 Fla. 342, 5 So. 801 (1889).
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he is for practical purposes in the position of plaintiff. 58 By parity
of reasoning, in proceedings by the Attorney General, a third person
will not be declared entitled to the office if the information fails to
show that he is so entitled; the incumbent is merely ousted upon
his failure to establish his title.59
In proceedings to oust a foreign corporation from its permit to
do business in the state the information need not set out the ultimate facts on which the Attorney General relies with the certainty
required in an indictment or declaration, since he is acting for
the sovereign in demanding that respondent show why it should not
be ousted. 60
Great particularity is required in the answer or plea, 61 which
must be responsive; and all the facts necessary to constitute a good
title must be set up. 62 In proceedings involving the right to elective office a mere denial that the relator received the number of
votes alleged in the information, or that he received a majority of
the votes cast at the election, or that he received a majority of the
legal votes, and a plea that the respondent is "not guilty," or that
he is not usurping the office, are insufficient in law. 63 A motion to
quash, or a demurrer in the earlier quo warranto proceedings, has
the same effect as in any other proceedings; it admits the truth of
64
the factual allegations in the information.
In original proceedings in the Supreme Court its Rules of Practice 27 and 30, to which latter the practitioner is referred by Rule
31, should be carefully observed. In proceedings before the circuit
courts Florida Common Law Rules 54, 58 and 57 govern. In either
event the petition for the writ must conform to the statutes on quo
warranto. 65 Attention is again called to Sections 80.01 - 80.04 of
Florida Statutes 1949, as well as, in certain special instances, to
58

State ex rel. Clark v. Klingensmith, 121 Fla. 297, 163 So. 704 (1935);
(1949).
State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Philips, 30 Fla. 579, 11 So. 922 (1892).
6OState ex rel. Landis v. S. H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823 (1934).
61
State ex rel. Landis v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra note 60; Enterprise v. State
ex rel. Att'y Gen., 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740 (1892).
62
E.g., State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1868).
63E.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Anderson, 26 Fla. 240, 8 So. 1 (1890).
64
Attorney General ex rel. Wilkins v. Connors, 27 Fla. 329, 9 So. 7 (1891).
65
Note that FLA. STAT. §47.10, even before the recent abolition of rule days,
expressly exempted quo warranto and the other extraordinary writs from its
provisions relating to date of returns.

cf.

FLA. STAT. §81.01
59
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Sections 104.10, 165.80, 542,03, 618.23, and 619.09.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the circuit
courts, and the Court of Record in and for Escambia County to
issue quo warranto 66 does not give the practitioner unlimited choice
67
of forum. The Supreme Court will not try questions of- fact.
Although the Court early held that the right to trial by jury on factual issues arising in proceedings by information in the nature of
quo warranto is guaranteed by Section 3 of the Declaration of Bights
of our Constitution, 68 this holding is limited to proceedings in the
circuit court; in original quo warranto proceedings in the Supreme
Court there is no right of jury trial, even though disputed factual
issues may arise.0 9 In such event the Supreme Court may at the
outset decline to take jurisdiction of the cause without prejudice to
the right of the relator to institute proceedings in the circuit court;
or upon reaching issue it may dismiss the proceedings without
prejudice; or it may appoint a commissioner to take testimony and
refer this to it, together with his findings, which are advisory only.70
The writ is discretionary and not of right; and the judiciary may
exercise its discretion in either granting or withholding judgment of
ouster. 7 ' The scope of relief obtainable as regards an office was
well expounded in 1868:72
"A writ of quo warranto affirms an existing right to an office,
or it destroys and sets aside the pretended claim of an usurper;
it controls him in the exercise of the office in no legitimate sense,
and it does not supervise its exercise, but destroys the power to
act, by denying the right to hold the office and pronouncing
judgment of ouster."
Again, in an action in quo warranto to test the right of individual
respondents to be a body corporate as trustees of a county fair, the
eGSee notes 10-12 supra.
67R. PsAc. Sup. CT. FLA. 27(1)(b).
GSBuckman v. State ex rel. Spencer, 34 Fla. 48, 15 So. 697 (1894); accord,
State ex rel. Clark v. Klingensmith, 126 Fla. 124, 170 So. 616 (1936).
6
9E.g., State ex rel. Davis v. Avon Park, 117 Fla. 565, 158 So. 159 (1934).
70 State ex rel. Clark v. Klingensmith, 126 Fla. 124, 170 So. 616 (1936).
A fourth possible method is also mentioned.
71 Winter Haven v. State ex rel. Landis, 125 Fla. 392, 170 So. 100 (1936).
72 State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190, 206 (1868).
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Court held that the relator was not entitled to an accounting for
taxes levied and collected by them, accounting being beyond the
legitimate scope of such a proceeding. 3
71
While appeal may be taken from a refusal to issue quo warranto,
an order, entered without a motion for new trial, vacating a judgment of ouster and allowing time for amending the answer may not
be so reviewed, since such order is neither a final judgment nor an
75
order granting a new trial.
CONCLUSION

While the Attorney General still has absolute discretion, complete authority, and unlimited responsibility in quo warranto proceedings, private individuals in their capacity as taxpayers and
citizens have been granted the privilege of instituting these proceedings upon his refusal to act. As indicated by the more recent
cases and the enactments of the Legislature, the rights and powers
of individual citizens in quo warranto proceedings are continually
on the increase, with the result that their opportunities for utilizing
this remedy are now greater than at any other time in the history of
our state.

73
State
74

ex rel. Landis v. Prevatt, 110 Fla. 29, 148 So. 578 (1933).
E.g., State ex rel. Bridges v. Henry, 60 Fla. 246, 53 So. 742 (1910); cf.
FLA. CONST. Art. V, §5.
75
State ex rel. Davis v. Safety Harbor, 101 Fla. 644, 135 So. 140 (1931);
cf. FLA. STAT. §§59.02, 59.04 (1949).
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